Conspiracy Liability and the FCPA: The Second Circuit\u27s Rare Interpretation of the FCPA in United States v. Hoskins and Its Potential Implications by Knudtsen, Morgan R.
William & Mary Business Law Review 
Volume 11 (2019-2020) 
Issue 3 Article 5 
April 2020 
Conspiracy Liability and the FCPA: The Second Circuit's Rare 
Interpretation of the FCPA in United States v. Hoskins and Its 
Potential Implications 
Morgan R. Knudtsen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Legislation 
Commons 
Repository Citation 
Morgan R. Knudtsen, Conspiracy Liability and the FCPA: The Second Circuit's Rare Interpretation 
of the FCPA in United States v. Hoskins and Its Potential Implications, 11 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. 
Rev. 771 (2020), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol11/iss3/5 
Copyright c 2020 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr 
 
771 
CONSPIRACY LIABILITY AND THE FCPA: THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT’S RARE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE FCPA IN UNITED STATES V. HOSKINS AND 
ITS POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS  
MORGAN R. KNUDTSEN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The scope of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is 
inherently difficult to ascertain. Over time, the SEC and DOJ have 
privately settled claims under the FCPA, leaving most interpreta-
tion to government agencies. Though agency interpretation happens 
frequently, there has been little interpretation over major questions 
such as who is subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction and how far that 
jurisdiction extends. United States v. Hoskins, which was decided 
in August 2018, involved the FCPA, conspiracy, and foreign cor-
porate officials. The Second Circuit in its decision subsequently 
limited the scope of the FCPA, holding that liability cannot extend 
to foreign persons who have never set foot in the United States or 
who do not fit within the categories set forth within the statute. 
Hoskins, a case of statutory interpretation, leaves many holes in our 
understanding of FCPA compliance and enforcement. This Note 
seeks to determine the implications the Second Circuit’s decision 
will have for future courts and defendants. 
∗ JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, Class of 2020; BA in Political 
Science, University at Albany, Class of 2017; BS in Economics, University at 
Albany, Class of 2017. The author would like to thank her parents for their 
love and support throughout her academic pursuits. Ms. Knudtsen would also 
like to thank the William & Mary Business Law Review staff and editorial boards 
for their assistance in preparing this Note for publication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or The Act) was 
the product of years of uncovered corporate corruption and bribery 
in the United States.1 Codified as part of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, the FCPA contains anti-bribery provisions, which pro-
hibit individuals from seeking favorable business opportunities 
by offering things of value to foreign officials.2 Almost inevitably, 
the government implemented the FCPA to require corporations 
to monitor their employees, comply with government standards, 
and prevent the bribery of foreign officials.3 As written, the statute 
addresses a class of persons that must comply with its command, 
seemingly identifying who can be liable for violating the FCPA.4 
However, though passed in the wake of Watergate, there remains 
a void in our understanding of the FCPA’s reach, making the Sec-
ond Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hoskins a stepping-stone 
to greater understanding of the law.5  
 Hoskins questioned the limits of the FCPA’s jurisdictional 
reach in addressing whether conspiracy liability may attach to 
individuals who have never stepped foot in the United States but 
have communicated with a U.S. corporation for the purpose of brib-
ing foreign officials.6 At the time of writing, the Hoskins story is 
seemingly complete, as the United States has declined to seek cer-
tiorari. The Second Circuit announced its decision in August 2018, 
offering an exceptional judicial interpretation of the FCPA and 
seemingly limiting the government’s fairly expansive reading of 
FCPA liability.7 Given the Circuit’s restriction on the government’s 
reach, this Note considers the unique position the government now 
faces in future FCPA prosecutions.  
1 See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 230 (1997).  
2 Taylor J. Phillips, The Federal Common Law of Successor Liability and 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 89, 92 (2015). 
3 Salbu, supra note 1, at 230–31.  
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1976). 
5 See Ezekiel K. Rediker, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Judicial Re-
view, Jurisdiction, and the “Culture of Settlement,” 40 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 53, 
54 (2015). 
6 See generally United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). 
7 Christian R. Martinez, Note, The Curious Case of Lawrence Hoskins: Eval-
uating the Scope of Agency Under the Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA, 53 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 211, 212, 214 (2020).  
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Notably, Hoskins renders a decision not only on the FCPA, 
but also on our understanding of conspiracy liability.8 In light of the 
Second Circuit’s decision, this Note begins with a brief overview 
of conspiracy liability as it has been interpreted across various courts. 
Part II then considers the unusual position the Second Circuit 
was in to consider the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach by briefly con-
sidering the historical background of the FCPA. Before concluding 
in Part IV, Part III shifts to demonstrate the Hoskins decision 
particularly focusing on how the Second Circuit used preexisting 
case law to establish its unique holding. Finally, in Part IV, this Note 
considers the practical side effects of Hoskins, its implications, 
and whether agency liability can—and will—attach to foreign in-
dividuals such as Mr. Hoskins in future litigation.  
I. CONSPIRACY LIABILITY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT— 
THE FOUNDATION FOR HOSKINS 
 Conspiracy liability is not a blanket rule that attaches to all 
individuals regardless of the underlying offense.9 Rather, there 
are inextricable common law exceptions to criminal liability that 
are often tied to legislative intent.10 The following discussions of-
fer valuable insight into the history of the inquiry addressed in 
Hoskins. Importantly, these cases have laid the foundation for the 
Second Circuit to ascertain just how conspiracy liability and leg-
islative intent work together to establish whether a statute can 
be extended to an unnamed class of individuals.11 As a necessary 
precondition, this Note considers the logic set forth in these cases 
to make sense of the Second Circuit’s holding. Subsequently, in 
Part III, this Note will consider how these cases uniquely shaped 
the Second Circuit’s decision, why the Second Circuit found Mr. 
Hoskins was not liable under the FCPA, and how the court arguably 
extended the narrow exception set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Gebardi v. United States.12  
8 See generally Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 76–77. 
9 See Shu-en Wee, Note, The Gebardi “Principles,” 117 COLUM. L. REV. 115, 
116 (2017). 
10 Id. at 119.  
11 Compare id., with Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 80–81. 
12 See infra Part III.  
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A. The Gebardi Principle: A Springboard Exception to Accomplice 
Liability  
 The leading case on conspiracy liability is the Supreme Court’s 
1932 decision in Gebardi v. United States.13 Historically, Gebardi 
was decided at a time when strict application of the conspiracy 
statute led to jarring results.14 Chiefly, the Supreme Court was con-
cerned with the fundamental irregularities that existed where a stat-
ute would expressly protect a certain class of persons, but where 
the federal conspiracy statute would subsequently hold that same 
class of individuals liable for the underlying crime.15 Consequently, 
the Court crafted a unique exception to conspiracy liability that 
protects against liability if a statute neglects to name a specific 
class of persons as a necessary component to the commission of 
the crime.16  
At issue in Gebardi was the Mann Act, a federal law prohibit-
ing the transportation of women for the purpose of sexual inter-
course in interstate commerce, notwithstanding a woman’s consent 
to the act.17 The Gebardi petitioners allegedly conspired to trans-
port a woman across state lines in violation of the Mann Act.18 
One of the named petitioners, however, was the woman trans-
ported.19 Thus, the question before the Court was whether there 
was sufficient evidence to support the woman’s conviction under 
a theory that she too conspired to commit the crime.20 The Court 
understood the fundamental irregularities set forth by the con-
spiracy statute and, in evaluating the statute’s text and the spe-
cific legislative intent at issue, declined to hold the woman liable 
for her participation in the crime.21 
 The Court heavily relied on the statute’s text, stating that 
the Act failed to condemn a woman for her consent to participate in 
13 See Wee, supra note 9, at 116.  
14 See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 115 (1932). 
15 See id. at 123.  
16 See id.  
17 Id. at 118–20. 
18 Id. at 115–16. 
19 Id. at 116.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 123. 
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the crime.22 Perhaps most importantly, the Court noted an under-
lying affirmative legislative policy to leave the woman free from 
liability.23 The Court articulated that the Mann Act was not in-
tended to punish a woman for “transporting herself” across state 
lines and, at the very least, liability could only attach if the 
woman helped another to transport herself.24 Instead, Congress 
designed the Mann Act to punish only those who actually sought 
to violate the law.25 The Court refused to extend liability to a 
woman who merely acquiesced to the principal’s violation.26 
 The key to understanding Gebardi and its subsequent cases 
requires careful consideration of statutory interpretation as the 
foundation for legislative intent. The Court first determined the plain 
language of the Mann Act supports its conclusion that Congress 
intended only for the Mann Act to hold those that “transport” liable, 
instead of those that merely participate.27 The statutory language 
created an underlying presumption that Congress intended to 
reach only a specific class of individuals.28 In expressly identifying 
who is liable for violations of the Mann Act, Congress implicitly 
and intentionally immunized all other classes of individuals by 
choosing not to name them in the statute.29 Immunization, however, 
is not absolute.30 The law may hold an unidentified class liable 
where application of the conspiracy statute does not contravene 
Congress’s underlying legislative policy.31 
 The principle set forth in Gebardi is arguably a rather nar-
row rule that seems to rely on the inherent differences between 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 118–19 (quoting United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140, 145 (1915)). 
25 Id. at 119–21, 123. 
26 Id. at 123. The Court’s reasoning in Gebardi is consistently applied in 
cases where individuals are found to be the victims of the underlying crime. For 
example, in cases of statutory rape, courts will routinely decline to hold the 
underage person liable for the crime as an accomplice or co-conspirator, even 
if they were active and willing participants. The logic evidently stems from 
Gebardi but may also stem from a societal principle that the laws should not 
aim to punish those the laws deem victims of the alleged crime.  
27 Id. at 118–19. 
28 Id. at 119. 
29 Wee, supra note 9, at 116, 123–24. 
30 Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123. 
31 Id. 
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statutes.32 Constructing statutes requires an “affirmative con-
gressional intent” to include or exclude certain classes from the 
law’s reach.33 With respect to the Mann Act, the Court reasoned 
that conspiracy to violate this specific kind of statute required 
more than consent to the principal’s conduct, and instead re-
quired active participation.34 The Court did not look to specific 
floor statements or to the law’s codified purpose, but instead 
looked to the specific text and the woman’s actual role in the com-
mission of the crime.35 
 As it stands, Gebardi authored a narrow, two-pronged as-
sessment for conspiracy liability. First, the statute must criminalize 
some action taken by an individual whose consent is an “insepa-
rable incident” that merges with the underlying crime,36 but whom 
the statute does not expressly punish.37 Having established this 
prong, a court must then consider whether there is more than 
mere consent to commit the alleged crime.38 Gebardi thus served 
as a starting point for later conspiracy cases by establishing that 
the fundamental presumption of immunity from conspiracy lia-
bility will only apply where the underlying offense both requires 
the named party to participate in the offense and where that party 
is not a class subject to liability in the underlying statute.39  
32 See id. For example, a law prohibiting bankruptcy fraud could result in 
the imposition of conspiracy liability, because there does not appear to be a 
“victimized” participant—all individuals would seem to participate in the crime 
and the law does not aim to protect individuals that participate. See id. The 
Mann Act, however, does not allow for conspiracy liability because the Act spe-
cifically aims to protect the woman transported for the commission of the 
crime. Id.  
33 See id. 
34 Jack C. Smith, Note, Grappling with Gebardi: Paring Back an Overgrown 
Exception to Conspiracy Liability, 69 DUKE L.J. 465, 475–76 (2019). 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 480.  
37 Id. at 477; see also Wee, supra note 9, at 123–24. 
38 Smith, supra note 34, at 477; see also Wee, supra note 9, at 123. The Court 
suggested that a woman may be liable for violations of the Mann Act if she was 
the “moving spirit” of the crime. Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 117. This seems to sug-
gest that the woman must actively suggest the cross-border trip, finance the 
means to travel across state lines, or perhaps blackmail another into violating 
the law. See id. 
39 Wee, supra note 9, at 121. 
778 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:771 
B. Gebardi in Application: Conflicting Interpretations of the  
Supreme Court’s Narrow Holding 
1. United States v. Amen: The Drug Kingpin Statute  
Prior to rendering its decision in Hoskins, the Second Circuit 
addressed Gebardi and conspiracy liability in relation to long-
standing criminal enterprises.40 At issue in Amen was the Contin-
uing Criminal Enterprise statute (“the Drug Kingpin Statute”), 
which subjects high officials of drug organizations to a maximum 
of life imprisonment for serving as the kingpin of an organiza-
tion.41 The key question before the court was whether a person 
could be liable for conspiring with the kingpin of the enterprise; 
it held that nonemployees of a continuing criminal enterprise 
“could never conspire to violate” the statute.42 
The case before the court involved a nonemployee who not only 
communicated with the kingpin’s subordinates but also performed 
acts for the kingpin.43 The statute, as written, did not directly ap-
ply to the “employees” or nonemployees of a drug enterprise.44 The 
government conceded this point but considered the fundamental 
differences between employees and nonemployees.45 The govern-
ment maintained that a nonemployee could “knowingly provide 
direct assistance” to the kingpin and, consequently, should be guilty 
as a co-conspirator to the crime.46  
 The Second Circuit, however, in relying on an expanded 
version of the Gebardi principles, held that the government did 
not have sufficient legislative history to support its interpreta-
tion.47 The Circuit read Gebardi to suggest that congressional 
identification of a liable party necessarily implies the exclusion of 
all others from liability for the underlying offense.48 In particular, 
the Drug Kingpin Statute contemplates liability for “top brass” 
40 See generally United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 375–76 (2d Cir. 1987). 
41 Id.; see also Smith, supra note 34, at 478. A drug kingpin has at least five 
subordinates and leads the drug organization. Id. at 478. 
42 Smith, supra note 34, at 479; see also Amen, 831 F.2d at 381.  
43 Amen, 831 F.2d at 377.  
44 Id. at 381. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 381–82. 
47 Id. at 382. 
48 Smith, supra note 34, at 479. 
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leaders, rather than “lieutenants and foot soldiers.”49 Because the 
statute suggests that only these individuals may be guilty for vi-
olating the law, nonemployees could not possibly be considered 
liable for aiding and abetting the kingpins.50  
The concept of ordinary or plain meaning of the text, rele-
vant legislative history, and substantive canons of construction 
tend to guide statutory interpretation, and did so in this case.51 
The Second Circuit heavily relied on the legislative history of the 
Drug Kingpin Statute to identify the affirmative policy set forth 
by Congress.52 The court first concluded that Congress only in-
tended to “target ringleaders of large-scale” operations, based on 
the statutory text alone.53 More importantly, the court deter-
mined that Congress failed to mention aiding and abetting in the 
kingpin statute and specifically expressed that the statute was 
not intended to “catch” aiders and abettors.54 While it is not nec-
essary for Congress to include an aiding and abetting provision 
for liability to attach based on the nature of the federal conspiracy 
statute, the substantive canons of statutory interpretation dic-
tated the court’s understanding of statutory intent.55 
The Second Circuit’s interpretation arguably finds similar 
credence in the traditional rule of lenity, which asks the court to 
interpret statutory ambiguities in favor of the defendant.56 The 
Amen court, however, expanded the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Gebardi by requiring Congress to fully disclose all liable parties 
within the statute or else fully relinquish the government’s ability 
to prosecute aiders and abettors through the federal conspiracy 
statute.57 This conclusion is surely inapposite to Gebardi, in which 
the Supreme Court anticipated that a woman could be liable for 
violations of the Mann Act in specific circumstances despite the 
49 Amen, 831 F.2d at 381 (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 
781 (1985)). 
50 Id.  
51 See Smith, supra note 34, at 469; Wee, supra note 9, at 125–26.  
52 Bridget Maloney, Comment, United States v. Amen: Aiding and Abetting 
Kingpins, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 503–04 (1998).  
53 Id. at 503; Amen, 831 F.2d at 381. 
54 Maloney, supra note 52, at 503; see Amen, 831 F.2d at 381 (citing H.R. 
1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4569).  
55 See Maloney, supra note 52, at 511–12. 
56 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, 698 (5th ed. 2016). 
57 Amen, 831 F.2d at 381–82.  
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statute’s silence.58 The Second Circuit’s early decision to expand 
Gebardi to a wholesale implication of intent from silence perhaps 
misinterprets the Supreme Court’s precedent and laid the foun-
dation for the 2018 Hoskins decision.  
2. Ocasio v. United States 
 More recently, in 2016, the Supreme Court decided a case 
relating to the “age-old principles of conspiracy” and violations of 
the Hobbs Act.59 Perplexingly, the Court questioned whether a 
public official could conspire with shop owners to extort them-
selves.60 Ocasio challenged his conspiracy conviction, alleging he 
could not conspire with individuals who voluntarily offered pay-
ment for referrals to their businesses.61 Curiously, in relying on 
principles set forth in Gebardi, the Court held that the shop own-
ers were capable of conspiring to extort themselves and, therefore, 
Ocasio was also liable under the federal conspiracy statute.62 
 In rendering its decision, the Court explained that the gov-
ernment need not prove individual intent to commit the underlying 
offense.63 Co-conspirators may come to an agreement where only one 
person commits the offense while the other provides support.64 Even 
in such a case, the latter party is “as guilty as the perpetrators.”65 
58 Compare id., with Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117 (1932). 
59 Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2016); see also Michael F. 
Dearington, Ocasio v. United States: The Supreme Court’s Sudden Expansion 
of Conspiracy Liability (And Why Bribe-Taking Foreign Officials Should Take 
Note), 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 204, 205 (2017). 
60 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1427–28. Ocasio, the shop owners, and nine other 
officers were charged with violations of the Hobbs Act and conspiracy to violate 
the Hobbs Act. Id. The underlying scheme involved the police officers directing 
damaged vehicles to the shop in exchange for kickbacks for the referral. Id.  
61 Sigourney Haylock, Comment, Distorting Extortion: How Bribery and Ex-
tortion Became One and the Same Under the Hobbs Act, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
285, 286 (2017).  
62 Dearington, supra note 59, at 205–06. 
63 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1429 (quoting 2 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL 
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 31:03, p. 226 (6th ed. 2008)); 
Dearington, supra note 59, at 207. 
64 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1430 (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 
64 (1997)) (internal quotations omitted); Dearington, supra note 59, at 207–08. 
65 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1430 (quoting Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64) (internal quo-
tations omitted); Dearington, supra note 59, at 208. 
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In so holding, the Court determined that the apparent victims of 
extortion may also be members of the conspiracy.66 
At its core, the Court stressed that even persons who are 
incapable of committing a crime against themselves may still be 
liable for conspiracy.67 Most importantly, the Court elaborated on 
the concepts set forth in Gebardi.68 Markedly, when a “person’s 
consent or acquiescence is inherent in the underlying substantive 
offense,” the government must establish more than just consent or 
acquiescence for liability to attach.69 In essence, consent is not 
enough for conspiracy.70 The shop owners here were incapable of 
committing the offense themselves, but criminal liability was proper 
because they “shared in the common purpose” of the kickbacks.71  
The Court failed, however, to describe what “more” was 
needed and how far an individual must go for the government to 
properly classify him as a co-conspirator.72 Notably, though the 
Court relied on the principles set forth in Gebardi, it neglected to 
consider whether Congress actually intended to define the shop own-
ers as a liable class.73 The Court seemed to misconstrue Gebardi 
to suggest that immunity applied there because the woman simply 
could not violate the Mann Act: a rationale fundamentally at odds 
with its earlier holding.74 Critically, by failing to rely on legisla-
tive intent, the Court made a fundamental error.75 The Court did, 
66 Id.  
67 Dearington, supra note 59, at 208. 
68 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1431–32 n.4; see Dearington, supra note 59, at 212. 
69 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432; Dearington, supra note 59, at 212. 
70 See Haylock, supra note 61, at 288.  
71 Id. 
72 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432; see Dearington, supra note 59, at 212. 
73 See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1439 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Dearington, supra 
note 59, at 213–14. 
74 Dearington, supra note 59, at 214–15. As described above, the Court did 
not deny the possibility that the woman charged in Gebardi could never be liable. 
See Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 117 (1932). The holding instead only 
required a showing that the woman was actually the driving force behind the viola-
tion and, if so, the government may succeed in establishing conspiracy liability. 
See Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 117. 
75 Dearington, supra note 59, at 214. Of course, the Supreme Court is not bound 
by precedent. However, the Court specifically relied on Gebardi and misapplied 
the principles and understandings initially set forth, leaving conspiracy liability 
in an unclear state. Id. 
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however, leave future courts with a well-established presumption 
that a co-conspirator need not voluntary commit the offense or 
even be capable of committing it to face criminal liability.76 
II. HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
After Watergate and the Vietnam War, all eyes were on the 
United States.77 Public backlash related to both political and corpo-
rate corruption consequently influenced President Carter to rehabil-
itate the United States in the eyes of the international community.78 
In doing so, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) began to 
investigate then-President Nixon and U.S.-based multinational com-
panies.79 The SEC’s investigations uncovered over 400 companies 
making illegal, or at the very least, suspicious, payments to for-
eign governments, their officials, and political parties.80 Notably, 
the SEC found these payments were part of rampant bribery for 
favorable business opportunities, which existed on an interna-
tional scale.81 Consequently, in 1977, Congress unanimously 
passed and adopted the FCPA to criminalize bribing or otherwise 
providing “corrupt payments to foreign officials ....”82 From its 
very inception, the FCPA was a revolutionary step in the scheme 
of widespread international bribery, as the United States became 
the only country to criminalize such behavior.83 
As initially enacted, the FCPA allows both the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and the SEC to bring civil or criminal charges 
against entities or individuals suspected of bribing foreign officials.84 
The key provisions at issue for the purposes of this Note are the 
anti-bribery provisions, which cover both “issuers” and “domestic 
concerns.”85 Originally, this meant the FCPA targeted issuers of 
76 Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432. 
77 See Rediker, supra note 5, at 57. 
78 See id.  
79 Id.  
80 Kevin K. Smith, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Set Aside the Moral 
and Ethical Debates, How Does One Operate Within this Law?, 45 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1119, 1122 (2017). 
81 See id.  
82 Rediker, supra note 5, at 57.  
83 Id. at 57–58.  
84 Phillips, supra note 2, at 92. 
85 Rediker, supra note 5, at 58. 
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certain securities regulated by the SEC as well as American citizens 
and corporations that arise under the laws of the United States.86 
To be guilty of an FCPA violation, the law further requires a pay-
ment, offer, or gift of something of monetary value to foreign offi-
cials or political parties, or to their intermediaries, who knew or 
should have known about the bribery.87 
A. Key Amendments to the FCPA: Extending Its Jurisdictional 
Reach 
 As initially implemented, the FCPA did not extend to foreign 
individuals or corporations.88 Nearly a decade after the FCPA was 
passed, the first amendment to the statute was introduced.89 In 
1988, Congress presented the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act to “encourage the international community” to enact 
similar anti-bribery legislation.90 The modified language added a 
scienter requirement that was intended to extend liability to third 
parties who have actual knowledge of the true intent of the pay-
ment or who have acted recklessly “with a conscious disregard for 
the truth.”91 Conversely, at that time, Congress recognized that 
86 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1977); Rediker, supra note 5, at 58. 
87 Ira Handa, Fallacies in the Current Methods of Prosecuting International 
Commercial Bribery, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 725, 726–27 (2016). As a result of the 
FCPA, corporations have developed strict compliance programs to ensure their full 
submission to the FCPA. Id. at 727. These compliance programs track both the anti-
bribery and the accounting provisions of the FCPA. See id. at 727, 743. The former 
aims to prevent bribery of foreign officials; the latter ensures corporations keep “ad-
equate records and internal audit systems.” Id. The government has instituted 
these programs in hopes that they prevent companies from falsely reporting to the 
SEC and the government. Id. at 743; see also Rahul Kohli, Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (2018). Furthermore, the FCPA is perhaps 
one of the greatest risks multinational companies take on. See Garrick Apollon, 
Article: FCPA Compliance Should Not ‘Cost An Arm And A Leg’: Assessing The 
Potential For Enhanced Cost-Efficiency And Effectiveness For An Anti-Corruption 
Compliance Program With The Implementation Of An Enterprise Legal Risk 
Management Framework, 5 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 486, 489 (2017). 
88 Rediker, supra note 5, at 58–59. Rediker notes that the FCPA was initially 
developed to police American businesses. There was an underlying expectation 
that other nations would look to the FCPA and create similar legislation that 
would curb corruption on an international scale. See id. 
89 Id. at 60. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 61. 
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legally made payments in foreign countries were not subject to 
FCPA scrutiny.92 
Much to Congress’s chagrin, however, other nations failed 
to follow suit.93 Thus, despite the laudable purpose, the FCPA in-
itially placed U.S. corporations at a competitive disadvantage in 
the international market.94 While international corporations could 
secure contracts through bribery, American corporations were forced 
to choose between obtaining favorable business deals and civil or 
criminal liability.95 Congress resolved this issue through addi-
tional amendments to the Act, which extended the FCPA’s juris-
diction beyond just U.S. corporations and individuals to include 
individuals and entities abroad.96  
A decade later, in 1997, the United States participated in 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (the OECD Convention).97 
At its close, thirty-four members signed a treaty pledging to adopt 
anti-bribery legislation within their individual states, which 
would model the standards set forth in the FCPA.98 Uniquely, the 
states also agreed that all jurisdictions governed by anti-corrup-
tion legislation would be interpreted broadly, such that “extensive 
physical connection to the bribery [was] not required.”99 The 
OECD Convention sought to bring corporations onto the same 
playing field by eliminating the competitive disadvantage U.S.-
based corporations had been facing for nearly twenty years.100 
92 Id. 
93 Sarah Routh, Tweet to Defeat Government Bribes: Limiting Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Combat Global Corpo-
rate Corruption, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 625, 630 (2018). 
94 Id. at 627.  
95 Rediker, supra note 5, at 63; see also Kayla Feld, Controlling the Prosecu-
tion of Bribery: Applying Corporate Law Principles to Define a “Foreign Official” 
in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 88 WASH. L. REV. 245, 256 (2013).  
96 Rediker, supra note 5, at 63; see also Barr Benyamin et al., Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2016).  
97 Rediker, supra note 5, at 62. 
98 Id. at 64; Routh, supra note 93, at 630–31.  
99 Rediker, supra note 5 (internal quotations omitted); see also Routh, supra 
note 93, at 631. 
100 Routh, supra note 93, at 631.  
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 Following the convention, Congress again amended the FCPA 
to further extend the FCPA’s jurisdiction to non-U.S. corporations 
and individuals.101 In implementing the Convention’s agreement 
to adopt greater anti-bribery legislation, Congress introduced the 
convention’s mandate into the FCPA.102 The amendment broadened 
the definitions set forth in the FCPA. 103 Notably, the broadened 
definitions included the expansion of “foreign officials” to include 
international public organizations, such as the United Nations, 
and their employees.104 Similarly, “the definition of ‘bribery’” now 
includes payments made to secure unjust or unfair advantages.105 
 Perhaps the most important change, however, involved the 
jurisdictional reach of the FCPA.106 Where the previous reach ap-
plied only to American citizens and corporations that used “the mails 
or means of interstate commerce,” the Amendment extended the 
FCPA’s reach to issuers, domestic concerns, or agents whether or 
not mails or interstate commerce are used at all.107 Consequently, 
the new Amendment allowed the Government to reach any ac-
tions taken by a party expressly recognized by the statute while 
they were in the United States or abroad.108 Facially, the Amend-
ment could be interpreted to apply only to acts taken in the United 
States that may violate the FCPA.109 However, in practice, the 
DOJ and the SEC have continued to read the FCPA’s jurisdiction 
broadly by attaching liability to all foreign corporations regardless of 
their connection to the United States.110 The expanded jurisdictional 
scope meant that foreign agents would also be subject to prosecu-
tion for violating the FCPA.111  
101 Rediker, supra note 5, at 62–63. 
102 Id. 
103 Rediker, supra note 5, at 63; see also Routh, supra note 93, at 631. 
104 Rediker, supra note 5, at 63. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
109 Routh, supra note 93, at 631. Despite the increased jurisdictional scope, 
foreign officials technically remained off the list of prosecutable parties under 
both the FCPA and the general conspiracy law. See id. at 639. 
110 Routh, supra note 93, at 631; see also Natasha N. Wilson, Pushing the 
Limits of Jurisdiction over Foreign Actors Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1063, 1069 (2014).  
111 Smith, supra note 34, at 1122. 
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B. A History of FCPA Enforcement   
The SEC and DOJ have sole authority to enforce the provi-
sions of the FCPA.112 Though the language of the Act suggests 
that those prosecuted must have a sufficient connection to the 
United States, beginning with George W. Bush’s administration 
and continuing to the present day, the SEC and DOJ have broadly 
applied the statute.113 Having implemented the 1998 Amend-
ments, agencies have had much wider discretion to prosecute 
those who allegedly violate the Act both in the United States and 
abroad.114 The DOJ and SEC have taken advantage of this power 
by prosecuting a significantly greater number of individuals since 
the FCPA’s enactment.115  
From its inception until the early 2000s, the DOJ and SEC 
prosecuted less than four actions each year.116 In 2010, and for 
the last decade, however, the DOJ and SEC have averaged be-
tween seventy and eighty annual FCPA actions.117 In 2010 alone, 
these agencies investigated seventy-four corporations and indi-
viduals, which resulted in the collection of over $1.8 billion in 
fines.118 Perhaps unsurprisingly, between 1999 and 2010, the U.S. 
continued to lead the OECD nations in the number of enforce-
ment actions it pursued.119 
112 Kohli, supra note 87, at 1272. 
113 Rediker, supra note 5, at 54. 
114 Id.  
115 Id. 
116 Routh, supra note 93, at 632; see also STANFORD LAW SCHOOL ARTHUR 
AND TONI REMBE ROCK CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COLLABORATION 
WITH SULLIVAN AND CROMWELL LLP, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT CLEARING-
HOUSE, http://fcpa.stanford.edu/statistics-keys.html [https://perma.cc/UY8W-3N4B] 
[hereinafter STANFORD LAW SCHOOL]. 
117 Routh, supra note 93, at 632; Emily Willborn, Extraterritorial Enforcement 
and Prosecutorial Discretion in the FCPA: A Call for International Prosecutorial 
Factors, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 422, 428 (2013).  
118 Willborn, supra note 117, at 428. 
119 Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in 
International Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. LEGIS. 303, 319 (2012). Over the 
same period, the United States obtained forty-eight criminal convictions, twenty-
seven plea agreements, and thirty-two deferred or non-prosecution agreements. 
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY: 2010 DATA 
ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION, COMPARATIVE TABLE OF 
ENFORCEMENT DATA COLLECTED FROM THE 38 PARTIES TO THE ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION, DECISIONS ON FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES FROM 1999 TO DECEMBER 
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Scholars have uniformly credited the 1998 Amendments for 
increased enforcement, given the Act’s expanded jurisdictional cover-
age to all persons, regardless of their nationality.120 While it is 
true that the number of prosecutions has decreased over the last 
few years, the decrease is perhaps due to a related increase in 
non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) and deferred prosecution agree-
ments (DPAs), as well as a general strengthening of FCPA en-
forcement.121 This includes a broader understanding of the FCPA’s 
jurisdictional reach, international cooperation, and incentivized 
disclosure to both the SEC and the government.122 Consequently, 
despite the government’s broad prosecutorial discretion to inves-
tigate alleged violations of the FCPA, most cases result in settle-
ment.123 Over time, NPAs and DPAs have become increasingly 
popular because they grant corporate defendants the ability to 
avoid the risk of costly litigation and harsh punishment at trial.124 
With NPAs and DPAs, corporations instead have the opportunity 
to settle their cases with civil fines and/or disgorgement.125  
Perhaps rather strategically, the U.S. government has chosen 
to use NPAs and DPAs in cases where the defendant is a foreign 
individual or corporate entity.126 As a result, corporations abroad 
2010, at 4 (Apr. 2011), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/39/47637707.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/F5T9-N6Y5]. Additionally, there have been thirty-seven noncriminal 
sanctions against individuals and forty-five noncriminal sanctions imposed on 
corporations. Id.  
120 Evan P. Lestelle, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International Norms 
of Foreign Public Bribery, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 83 TUL. L. REV. 
527, 535–36 (2008); see also Klaw, supra note 119, at 320.  
121 See Kohli, supra note 87, at 1273; Routh, supra note 93, at 632–33. 
122 Kohli, supra note 87, at 1273; Routh, supra note 93, at 633. 
123 Rediker, supra note 5, at 87. 
124 Id. 
125 Routh, supra note 93, at 633. Specifically, over the last forty years, 
ninety-two percent of defendants settled their FCPA claims with the SEC, and 
seventy-four percent of defendants settled with the DOJ following investiga-
tions that lasted an average of thirty-eight months. STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, supra 
note 116. Importantly, thirty-five percent of all FCPA violations involve foreign 
defendants. Id. Foreign corporations have settled some of the largest cases with 
the United States, including a 2017 settlement of $965 million by a Swedish cor-
poration. Richard L. Cassin, Telia Tops Our New Top Ten List (After We Do Some 
Math), FCPA BLOG (Sept. 22, 2017, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog 
/2017/9/22/telia-tops-our-new-top-ten-list-after-we-do-some-math.html [https:// 
perma.cc/N6A6-5SWL].  
126 See Annalisa Leibold, Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA Under 
International Law, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 225, 257–58 (2015).  
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tend not to challenge the FCPA’s jurisdiction, leaving the Second 
Circuit in a unique position to challenge long-standing govern-
ment practices.127 The tactical use of settlements has thus led to 
circular statutory interpretation and enforcement, whereby the 
SEC and DOJ have had wide discretion to both interpret and en-
force their understanding of the FCPA without being subject to 
judicial review.128 Without review and with an underdeveloped 
body of case law, these agencies have seemingly stretched the 
FCPA to capture illegal conduct that perhaps has no connection 
to the United States at all.129 Until 2018, the DOJ and SEC had 
nearly exclusive power to interpret the language of the FCPA.130 
The Act’s broad language has remained virtually unchal-
lenged leaving the SEC and DOJ with few restrictions.131 Schol-
ars routinely critique the Act for its failure to define key terms.132 
Key to this Note, the FCPA states “a foreign official” can be an 
instrumentality of “any officer or employee of a foreign govern-
ment,” but fails to define who can be an instrumentality.133 The 
FCPA’s “lack of clarity” in this area grants prosecutors substan-
tial power to interpret the ambiguous language of the FCPA and 
has been a major concern for legal scholars and courts alike,134 
but the DOJ and SEC have failed to address this confusion.135  
With the large number of settlements that have occurred, 
there is an unfortunate shortage of jurisprudence regarding the true 
meaning and reach of the FCPA.136 This shortage is perhaps the 
foundation for cases such as Hoskins, which has conceivably opened 
the door for future challenges to the FCPA. As agencies continue 
to enforce the FCPA, who may be charged with violations becomes 
as difficult a question to answer as what must be done to ensure 
compliance with the ostensibly broad-reaching statute. 
127 Routh, supra note 93, at 633; see also Leibold, supra note 126, at 240. 
128 Routh, supra note 93, at 633, 641; see also Leibold, supra note 126, at 240. 
129 Routh, supra note 93, at 633; see also Leibold, supra note 126, at 240. 
The broad discretion exercised by these agencies has resulted in nearly $1 billion 
through settlements. Routh, supra note 93, at 641.  
130 Rediker, supra note 5, at 55. 
131 Routh, supra note 93, at 628.  
132 Id. at 642. See Alexander G. Hughes, Drawing Sensible Borders for the Defi-
nition of “Foreign Official” Under the FCPA, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 253, 256–57 (2013).  
133 Hughes, supra note 132, at 256. 
134 Rediker, supra note 5, at 54. 
135 Hughes, supra note 132, at 256. 
136 Rediker, supra note 5, at 54–55. 
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C. Precedent, Conspiracy, and the FCPA: United States v. Castle 
 An important step in understanding the FCPA came in 
1991 when the Fifth Circuit expressly examined the relationship 
between conspiracy liability and the FCPA.137 Though decided be-
fore the 1998 Amendments, Castle determined the FCPA could 
consistently be applied with regard to international law.138 The 
Castle decision set forth ample precedent for the Second Circuit 
as the first appellate decision on whether foreign officials can con-
spire to violate the FCPA.139  
Castle involved the indictment of Canadian officials for vi-
olations of the FCPA and federal conspiracy law.140 Allegedly, a 
U.S.-based company paid Canadian officials a $50,000 bribe to se-
cure a favorable government contract.141 Relying on Gebardi, the 
district court dismissed the claims and the Fifth Circuit subse-
quently affirmed.142 As an important precursor, the court held 
that foreign officials, who were the very subject of the bribes, can-
not be charged for conspiring to violate the FCPA because, as the 
target, they cannot themselves substantively violate the FCPA.143 
Because the Canadian officials were central to the actual commis-
sion of an FCPA violation, the Fifth Circuit determined there was 
“overwhelming evidence” that Congress intended to exempt for-
eign officials who merely received a bribe.144 
As in other cases of conspiracy liability, the court drew on 
legislative intent.145 Namely, the statute’s failure to expressly ad-
dress the subject of the bribes led the Fifth Circuit to determine 
there was an affirmative legislative policy not to punish the Ca-
nadian officials as co-conspirators.146 The court emphasized that 
the Court in Gebardi “refused to disregard Congress’ intention to 
exempt” a class of persons by allowing the class to be prosecuted 
137 See generally United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1991); 
Dearington, supra note 59, at 221.  
138 Klaw, supra note 119, at 363.  
139 Dearington, supra note 59, at 221. 
140 Castle, 925 F.2d at 832. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 836. 
143 Dearington, supra note 59, at 221. 
144 Castle, 925 F.2d at 835.  
145 Id.; Dearington, supra note 59, at 212. 
146 United States v. Lake, 472 F.3d 1247, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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under the conspiracy statute.147 Given the Gebardi principle, the 
Fifth Circuit analogized the FCPA to the Mann Act.148 The court 
articulated how the statutes were drafted in a similar manner, 
which was indicative of congressional intent to limit the FCPA’s 
reach.149 In so arguing, the court reasoned Congress understood 
how far it could extend the FCPA but deliberately chose only to 
penalize the active participants in the bribe.150 Consequently, to 
disregard Congress’s intent to expressly limit the statute’s reach 
would be to disregard binding precedent.151 
In its holding, the Fifth Circuit recognized that in drafting the 
FCPA, it was evident that there would be instances in which foreign 
officials would accept bribes offered to them.152 Congress, however, 
did not place liability on or “condemn the foreign official’s conduct 
under the statute.”153 Congress instead wished merely to prosecute 
and proscribe the actual conduct of bribing foreign officials by per-
sons or entities within the United States rather than the mere ac-
ceptance of a bribe.154 It seems fair to suggest Castle interpreted 
the FCPA as exhibiting congressional intent not to embarrass 
“friendly [ ] governments” by punishing foreign officials for ac-
cepting bribes.155 
An alternate theory, however, is merely that the Fifth Circuit 
believed there was only a one-sided approach set forth in the 
FCPA.156 In essence, to prosecute only those who participate in 
the act of bribery regardless of the briber’s location.157 The Circuit’s 
holding can thus be narrowed by attaching liability to “every pos-
sible person connected to the” bribes, except for those on the demand 
side of the transaction.158 This interpretation would seem to suggest 
147 Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222. 
148 Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222. 
149 Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222. 
150 Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222; see also Garen 
S. Marshall, Increasing Accountability for Demand-Side Bribery in International 
Business Transactions, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1283, 1293 (2013).  
151 Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222. 
152 Castle, 925 F.2d at 833; Dearington, supra note 59, at 222. 
153 Dearington, supra note 59, at 224. 
154 Castle, 925 F.2d at 835; Dearington, supra note 59, at 224. 
155 Castle, 925 F.2d at 835; see also Letter from Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary 
of Commerce, to Senator William Proxmire (June 11, 1976). 
156 Klaw, supra note 119, at 309; Sarah Bartle et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1265, 1276 (2014).  
157 See Klaw, supra note 119, at 309. 
158 Castle, 925 F.2d at 835; see also Marshall, supra note 150, at 1287.  
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that Hoskins-like situations will not be affected because Hoskins, 
as discussed below, involved a supply side transaction. While 
there are clear implications for international relations if a foreign 
official is prosecuted in the United States for accepting a bribe, it 
is much less clear whether there are diplomatic concerns with en-
forcement actions against foreign participants in a U.S.-based brib-
ery scheme.159 Thus, the question before the Second Circuit was 
still a case of first impression.  
 Since the Circuit decided Castle, the government has widely 
accepted its holding and, until recently, has not prosecuted foreign 
officials for alleged FCPA violations under a theory of conspiracy 
liability.160 Furthermore, in line with Castle, in 2012 the SEC and 
DOJ released guidance expressly indicating “that bribe-taking 
foreign officials are not liable under the general federal conspir-
acy statute.”161 
All things considered, the question remains whether Castle 
remains good law in light of the Court’s decision in Ocasio.162 
While foreign officials cannot bribe themselves or commit FCPA 
violations single-handedly, the Supreme Court’s precedent estab-
lishes they are not inherently barred from a conspiracy charge.163 
Arguably, in examining the FCPA under the lens of Ocasio or 
Gebardi, if a foreign official does more than consent or acquiesce to 
the bribe, he arguably has done enough to establish co-conspirator 
liability under the FCPA.164 
III. UNITED STATES V. HOSKINS 
A. History and District Court Opinion 
 United States v. Hoskins involved a citizen of the United 
Kingdom, Lawrence Hoskins, employed by a U.K.-based subsidiary 
of Alstom, a French multinational company.165 The DOJ alleged 
Hoskins played a part in a scheme in which three Alstom executives, 
159 See Cortney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid 
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 460 (2009).  
160 Dearington, supra note 59, at 224–25. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 See id. at 225–26. 
164 See id. at 227–28. 
165 902 F.3d 69, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., concurring); see also United 
States v. Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d 316, 318 (D. Conn. 2015). 
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some of whom worked for Alstom’s U.S. subsidiary, bribed Indo-
nesian officials to obtain a $118 million contract.166 The United 
States government alleged that the Alstom U.S. executives met 
multiple times while in the United States to discuss and further 
the bribery scheme.167 Further, it was alleged that the executives 
frequently communicated via phone and email.168 
 According to the DOJ, Alstom U.S. paid consultants to de-
liver the bribe to the Indonesian officials.169 Hoskins was purport-
edly responsible for selecting those consultants and authorizing the 
payments with full knowledge of the purpose of the payments to 
both influence and assist Alstom in obtaining a contract.170 To 
further tie the consultants to the United States the indictment 
asserted one of the consultants had a bank account in Maryland.171 
 Notably, Hoskins never worked for Alstom U.S. and had 
never stepped foot in the United States at any point during the 
Indonesian bribery scheme.172 Nonetheless, the DOJ charged 
Hoskins with conspiring to violate the FCPA, aiding and abetting 
an FCPA violation, and with substantive FCPA violations.173 At 
trial, Hoskins moved to dismiss the conspiracy count.174 Hoskins’s 
chief argument was that the DOJ could not charge him with con-
spiracy because he did not fall within the expressly defined cate-
gories of defendants Congress anticipated and intended would be 
charged under the FCPA.175  
 In the alternative, the DOJ alleged Hoskins was an agent 
of Alstom’s U.S. subsidiary.176 This theory centered on a number 
of emails and telephone calls between Hoskins and his U.S.-based 
co-conspirators.177 Therefore, the government argued, it was at 
166 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 318. 
167 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 327. 
168 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 327. 
169 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 318. 
170 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72. 
171 See id. 
172 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 318, 327 n.14. 
173 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 73; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 318–19 n.1. 
174 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 73; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 317. 
175 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 73; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 320. 
176 CHRISTOPHER B. BRINSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10197, CAN A FOR-
EIGN EMPLOYEE OF A FOREIGN COMPANY BE FEDERALLY PROSECUTED FOR FOREIGN 
BRIBERY? 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10197.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C9C 
-ZAJW]. 
177 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 72; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 327. 
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least plausible that Hoskins could be convicted for violating the 
FCPA as an accessory or co-conspirator despite lacking a physical 
presence in the United States.178 
 In responding to the question, the district court refused to 
dismiss the DOJ’s claim that Hoskins was liable as an agent.179 
However, the court held that the FCPA cannot reach a non-resident 
foreign national who is not an agent of a U.S. company and who 
does not commit acts while physically present in the United States.180 
The court consequently foreclosed the possibility of conspiracy lia-
bility.181 The district court relied on the statute’s legislative intent, 
specifically finding the categories of persons expressly mentioned 
in the FCPA were the only class of persons subject to the Act’s 
jurisdictional reach.182 Moreover, the district court held, “Con-
gress did not intend to impose accomplice liability on non-resident 
foreign nationals who were not subject to direct liability” under 
the FCPA.183 The government subsequently appealed.184 
B. Second Circuit’s Affirmation 
 On appeal, the court addressed whether Hoskins, a foreign 
national who had never entered the United States or worked for 
a U.S. based company, could be held liable under conspiracy or 
complicity theories for violating the FCPA.185 The Second Circuit 
carefully framed the question, indicating what while Hoskins was 
“incapable of committing [substantive FCPA violations] as a prin-
cipal” the key issue on appeal was whether he could still be liable 
as an accomplice or co-conspirator.186 In answering the question, 
the Second Circuit focused on history and precedent, the legality 
of conspiracy liability, the affirmative legislative policy exemp-
tion, and the presumption against extraterritorial application.187 
178 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 73; Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 325. 
179 Hoskins, 123 F. Supp. 3d at 327. 
180 Id. 
181 See id. at 327, 327 n.14. 
182 Id. at 325. 
183 Id. at 327. 
184 Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 2018). 
185 Id. at 76. 
186 Id. 
187 See generally Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69. 
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 Common law has long-standing practical effects, particu-
larly with respect to conspiracy liability.188 In particular, at common 
law, one who intentionally directs or facilitates the crimes physically 
executed by others is still accountable for their actions under the 
laws of the United States.189 This implicit rule has since been cod-
ified to hold accountable those who may not personally commit 
crimes but who “‘aid[ ], abet[ ], counsel[ ], command[ ], induce[ ] 
or produce[ ] the commission of” a crime by another.190 As the Second 
Circuit notes, conspiracy liability can still attach even when the per-
son “was incapable of committing the substantive offense” himself.191 
 Beyond basic conspiracy liability, common law has identi-
fied an affirmative legislative policy exception.192 The exception 
functions similarly to a canon of construction, considering the leg-
islature’s intent not to extend liability to specific groups of indi-
viduals even if the statutory text requires compliance.193 Here, 
both Hoskins and the government put forth their understanding 
of this affirmative legislative exception, debating whether the leg-
islative policy exception applies to the FCPA and, more specifi-
cally, whether Congress meant to extend liability.194 
 Notwithstanding the legislative policy exception, the Second 
Circuit heavily relied on the presumption against extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.195 This presumption similarly seeks to understand 
congressional intent.196 Here, the court assessed whether the 
FCPA provides “a clear, affirmative indication that it applies ex-
traterritorially.”197 More importantly, the Second Circuit had to 
determine whether the conduct in question occurred in the United 
States.198 If so, the conduct may permissibly be susceptible to legal 
action in the United States under the FCPA even if the conduct 
occurred abroad.199 
188 See id. at 77. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 77 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)). 
191 Id. (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 64 (1997)).  
192 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 77. 
193 Id. at 77–78. 
194 Id. at 78. 
195 Id. at 95 (quoting RJR Nabisco, Inc., v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 
2100 (2016)). 
196 Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 96–97. 
199 Id.  
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 All things considered, when examining the district court’s 
ruling, the Circuit unanimously rejected both the DOJ’s theory of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and its broad-sweeping understanding 
of jurisdiction.200 The Circuit agreed with the district court find-
ing that Congress affirmatively excluded foreign individuals from 
liability when it drafted the FCPA.201 The Circuit’s immediate af-
fect consequently narrowed the FCPA’s reach.202 
The Second Circuit, nevertheless, did reverse in part.203 
The Circuit disagreed with the district court’s determination that 
because Hoskins never entered the United States, he could not be 
prosecuted under the FCPA.204 The court instead recognized that 
if the government could prove Hoskins was an agent of a domestic 
concern, he could still be liable under the FCPA for conspiring 
with employees and other Alstom agents.205 It is this very holding 
that may have implicit effects for future litigation. 
C. Application of Precedent to United States v. Hoskins 
The Second Circuit primarily relied on Gebardi and Amen 
as sounding boards to define the very contours of conspiracy lia-
bility and affirmative legislative policy.206 The Circuit seemingly 
accepted the Court’s ruling in Gebardi, maintaining that such li-
ability does not exist where the legislature expresses a clear in-
tent to leave certain classes of persons beyond the statute’s scope.207 
The court stressed Gebardi’s need for “something more” for liability 
to attach because congressional silence inherently acts as “a con-
ferral of immunity.”208 The overarching need for “something more” 
is, at its core, a searching examination of congressional intent, 
particularly as it relates to the text of the statute.209  
200 Id. at 97. 
201 Id. at 74, 97. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 72. 
204 Id. at 98. 
205 Id. at 72. 
206 Id. at 78–80. 
207 Id. at 80. 
208 Id. (citing Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121–23 (1932)). 
209 Libby Gerstner, Case Comment, United States v. Hoskins: An Originalist 
Approach to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 27 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 
384 (2019) (citing Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 81).  
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Before ruling in Hoskins, the Second Circuit had already 
established that circumventing the statute’s purpose by extending 
conspiracy liability would be a disservice to legislative intent.210 In 
both Amen and Hoskins, by looking at the “text of the statute and 
the purpose that Congress was trying to achieve,” the Circuit rea-
soned it was obliged to impose congressional will in interpreting 
the statute at issue.211 The Second Circuit’s use of originalism ex-
tends from Amen to Hoskins as a means of understanding and 
analyzing criminal statutes in a manner that allows others to fully 
escape criminal liability.212  
 The government proposed that Gebardi only applies if “(1) 
‘the defendant’s consent or acquiescence is inherent in the [sub-
stantive] offense,’ or (2) ‘the defendant’s participation in the crime 
is frequently, if not normally, a feature of the [substantive] crim-
inal conduct.’”213 The Second Circuit, however, used Amen’s guid-
ing principles to reject the government’s contention that Gebardi 
should be narrowly read.214 
In rejecting the first proposal, the court found it to be “fore-
closed” under Wharton’s Rule, which prohibits liability from at-
taching based on the exact agreement at issue in substantive 
crimes.215 Amen further supported this supposition by refusing to 
extend liability to third parties who were “required for a criminal 
enterprise to exist,” but who were not the subject of the statute.216 
 The government’s second argument failed for strikingly 
similar reasons—legislative intent.217 In both Gebardi and Amen, 
the statutes did not require “frequent[ ], if not normal[ ]” conduct 
210 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 80 (citing United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 382 
(2d Cir. 1987)).  
211 Id. at 80–81. 
212 See Gerstner, supra note 209, at 383. 
213 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 81 (quoting Appellant’s Opening Br. At 24). 
214 See id. at 385. 
215 Id. Wharton’s Rule requires conspiracy indictments to be dismissed be-
fore trial. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 774 (1975). The rule operates 
as an exception to a principle that conspiracy and the substantive offense can-
not converge where two or more persons, together, commit the underlying 
crime and the “immediate consequences of the crime” impact the “parties them-
selves rather than … society at large.” Id. at 782–83. 
216 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 82 (citing United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 382 
(2d Cir. 1987)). 
217 Id. 
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related to the criminal activity.218 Instead of focusing on frequency, 
the Court required there be action or participation by the charged 
party on every occasion for which there had been an alleged viola-
tion.219 Unlike the Mann Act, which had the potential to impose 
liability on women for transporting themselves, the Circuit rea-
soned the FCPA contains no such possibility.220 Rather, the text 
of the FCPA expressly identifies who is subject to the statute, and 
arguably does not leave open the possibility for further extension 
to others.221 According to the court, the very omission of language 
that would cover a foreign official acting outside of the United States 
and not on behalf of any American person or company dictates that 
such a person cannot be liable.222 By considering congressional 
hearings and floor debates to identify legislative intent—which 
has often been critiqued as an unreliable source to determine the 
statute’s intent—the court held true to its precedent.223  
 In the United States, it is accepted that while our laws govern 
conduct on American soil, they “do[ ] not rule the world” unless 
Congress has deliberately and intentionally expressed such an in-
tent.224 In essence, the Second Circuit seemingly relied on a pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law.225 This 
presumption against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory con-
struction that requires the court to determine whether the conduct is 
domestic.226 Only where a statute expressly states its intent to 
apply to “foreign matters” can the presumption be overcome.227 
Importantly, as a canon of construction, the presumption is not 
dispositive and cannot be considered in a vacuum.228 Assuming 
the presumption has not been rebutted, the court may ascertain 
218 Id. at 81–82. 
219 Id.  
220 Id. at 84. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 85. 
223 See United States v. Firtash, 392 F. Supp. 3d 872, 891 (N.D. Ill. 2019); see 
also Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1130 (1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textu-
alism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 641 (1990). 
224 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (quot-
ing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)). 
225 See Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 95 (citing RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100–01). 
226 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).  
227 Id.  
228 Id.  
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whether the conduct occurred in the United States—thereby re-
quiring a domestic application of the law—or, alternatively, if the 
alleged crime occurred abroad.229  
In application, the Second Circuit determined that the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application could not be rebut-
ted.230 First, the FCPA was arguably clear on its territorial limits; 
unless a foreign national either commits a crime within the confines 
of the United States or is otherwise an agent, employee, or share-
holder or an American issuer or domestic concern, liability will 
not be imposed.231 Congress’s deliberate choice to exclude foreign 
nationals from the Act effectively necessitated a holding that Hoskins 
could not be liable under either conspiracy or complicity theories 
of liability.232 
 Given the Second Circuit’s holding, there appears to be tension 
between the Hoskins decision and Gebardi.233 By its own account, the 
Second Circuit did follow its established precedent.234 In doing so, 
the Circuit underscored how Amen continues to be fundamentally 
at odds with Gebardi and how that has impacted its holding.235 
Amen relied on the mere absence of evidence to find congressional 
intent.236 The Gebardi exception, in contrast, was rather narrow, 
identifying an exception only where the court could ascertain an af-
firmative legislative policy.237 The absence of a clear statement of 
liability in Gebardi did not foreclose such accountability, and instead 
meant the court must instead undergo a searching analysis for 
intent.238 The cases are further distinct in that Amen relied more 
on legislative history than statutory text, which the Gebardi Court 
examined closely as a means to decipher the statute’s underlying 
purpose.239 Despite the application of precedent in Hoskins, the 
Circuit’s decision is not inherently incorrect or inconsistent with 
its past decisions. Rather, and perhaps more problematic to our 
229 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 95 (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100). 
230 Id. at 96.  
231 Id.  
232 Id. at 97; see also Gerstner, supra note 209, at 387.  
233 See United States v. Firtash, 392 F. Supp. 3d 872, 891 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
234 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 96. 
235 See Firtash, 392 F. Supp. at 891. Compare Gebardi v. United States, 287 
U.S. 112, 123 (1932), with United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 1987).  
236 Amen, 831 F.2d at 382.  
237 Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123.  
238 Compare Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 121–23, with Amen, 831 F.2d at 382. 
239 Compare Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123, with Amen, 831 F.2d at 382. 
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understanding of the FCPA, Hoskins merely makes for continued 
confusion in this area of the law.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S RULING 
 Hoskins left the courts in a unique position for future ap-
plications of conspiracy liability and the FCPA. At this point, this 
Note addresses the potential implications that the Hoskins deci-
sion will have in future FCPA investigations and litigation. The 
potential effects are addressed in two parts. First, this Note will 
focus on the proactive steps the government could take in an at-
tempt to re-expand its jurisdiction or, conversely, to codify the 
Second Circuit’s holding. Beyond these affirmative steps, this Note 
aims to examine solutions to the Second Circuit’s restrictions on 
the FCPA’s extraterritorial position. Primarily, this portion will 
assess a return to agency theory in the circuits in the prosecution 
of foreign individuals and companies for FCPA violations.   
A. Potential for Circuit Splits and Potential Congressional Action 
At present, the government has not sought a rehearing or 
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. This 
is perhaps not surprising, given the Second Circuit was the first to 
directly address whether foreign nationals could conspire to violate 
the FCPA.240 Given the FCPA’s expansive reach and the compliance 
requirements set forth by the statute, it is necessary for companies 
and individuals to fully understand the implications of the law. 
The recency of the decision lends itself to much speculation 
as to the primary effects Hoskins will have on FCPA regulations 
and prosecutions. Companies have a unique and expected ten-
dency to avoid litigation, leaving individuals to bear the weight of 
prosecutions because they often have less incentive to settle their 
cases.241 Consequently, the government may take new approaches to 
240 Kimberly A. Parker et al., Second Circuit Limits Government’s Ability to 
Prosecute Foreign Persons and Companies for Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA, 
WILMERHALE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client   
-alerts/20180828-second-circuit-limits-governments-ability-to-prosecute-foreign 
-persons-and-companies-for-conspiracy-to-violate-the-fcpa [https://perma.cc/NW 
Q8-55DR]. 
241 STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 116. 
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old methods while simultaneously attempting to expand its juris-
diction over these cases. 
Before Hoskins, there was already substantial confusion as 
to the FCPA’s reach. Adding to the confusion in this area of the 
law, the Hoskins decision inherently contravenes the DOJ and 
SEC’s 2012 joint Resource Guide.242 The Guide describes the SEC 
and DOJ’s stance on aiding and abetting and conspiracy, specifi-
cally in relation to the anti-bribery provisions.243 According to the 
Guide, the FCPA retains jurisdiction over any conspirators so long 
as one of the conspirators is “an issuer, domestic concern, or com-
mits a reasonably foreseeable overt act” in the United States.244 
By logical extension, the Resource Guide explains the SEC’s position 
that “[i]ndividuals and companies, including foreign nationals and 
companies, may also be liable for conspiring to violate the FCPA ... 
even if they are not, or could not be, independently charged with 
a substantive FCPA violation.”245 Of note, either “a foreign, non-
issuer company” or an individual may be guilty for conspiracy to 
engage in a substantive FCPA violation.246 
 Accordingly, by the agencies’ very definition and understand-
ing of the FCPA, the Second Circuit’s decision is directly adverse 
to its approach to foreign individuals.247 The holding is remarka-
ble not only because it is contrary to long-standing agency inter-
pretation, but also because it has subsequently narrowed the SEC 
and DOJ’s reach to non-residents or foreign companies involved 
in FCPA conspiracies, unless the proscribed conduct occurs in the 
242 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO 
THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 34 (2012), https://www.justice.gov 
/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/ATC6-4HU8] [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE]. The Resource Guide was developed 
for the purpose of explaining and answering some of the most pressing questions 
about the FCPA including, but not limited to, the costs of corruption, the Anti-
Bribery Provisions, and guidance on the enforcement of the FCPA. Id. at Foreword. 
The Resource Guide thus serves the overarching purpose of guiding businesses in 
their compliance of the basic precepts of the FCPA’s bribery and accounting provi-
sions. Id. It is crucial to note that corporate bribery has a significant impact on 
overseas business which, in a free market system, fundamentally influences the 
price and quality of goods or services. Id. (quoting United States Senate, 1977). 
243 Id. at 34. 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 See generally United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2018); RE-
SOURCE GUIDE, supra note 242. 
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United States.248 The Circuit’s decision to override the govern-
ment’s “long-held position about the scope of the FCPA” leaves 
unanswered a number of questions about the FCPA’s scope and 
how the government will proceed in the future.249 Furthermore, 
because FCPA violations are often not brought to trial, it becomes 
unclear if or even when these questions will be addressed.250 
Perhaps one of the most pressing issues is how the govern-
ment will pursue future FCPA charges for foreign individuals and 
corporations following Hoskins. Evidently, Hoskins is binding 
precedent on the district courts within the Second Circuit and will 
be persuasive to the circuit if the same issue arises. However, 
while the court’s decision is persuasive to others, it does not nec-
essarily foreclose its sister circuits from exercising their own ju-
dicial review in similar cases.251 In fact, while the Seventh Circuit 
has not yet addressed the same question, its precedent has de-
clined to impose the Hoskins approach.252  
 In particular, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in United States v. 
Pino-Perez considered the Drug Kingpin Statute at issue in Amen.253 
The case involved a drug supplier rather than the organization’s 
kingpin.254 As in Amen, the defendant alleged that aiding and 
abetting liability did not and in fact could not apply.255 The Seventh 
Circuit specifically rejected Amen’s reliance on legislative history 
and instead explained that liability attaches automatically through 
the conspiracy statute, indicating that congressional intent should 
not be the key to a court’s decision on liability.256 Only in a limited 
number of circumstances are individuals immune from liability as 
an aider and abettor.257 The Circuit continued, stating that only 
248 See Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 69; RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 242. 
249 Second Circuit Decision Limits FCPA Jurisdiction as to Foreign Nationals 
Outside the United States, O’MELVENY (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.omm.com/re 
sources/alerts-and-publications/alerts/second-circuit-decision-limits-fcpa-juris 
diction-as-to-foreign-nationals-outside-the-united-states/ [http://perma.cc/GbBY 
-4UJ2]. 
250 STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 116. 
251 See United States v. Firtash, 392 F. Supp. 3d 872, 889 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
252 Firtash, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 891. 
253 See United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1231 (7th Cir. 1989).  
254 Id.  
255 Id. at 1233. 
256 Id. at 1234.  
257 Firtash, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 891; see also Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1234. 
The Seventh Circuit determined that individuals are not aiders and abettors 
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in those specifically defined circumstances may a court determine 
that Congress intended to shield accomplices from liability.258  
 Thus, there is a possibility that the DOJ or SEC will pursue 
conspiracy charges in these sister circuits in the hopes of reaching 
a contrary result. Should the agencies make such a decision, the 
circuits will either agree with the government’s expansive view of 
the FCPA or find the Second Circuit’s logic more persuasive. If the 
government attempts to expand the FCPA through further court 
cases, there is increased potential for circuit splits and a much 
greater likelihood of the Supreme Court granting certiorari. How-
ever, because most FCPA actions are settled, it seems unlikely that 
there will be an increase in cases to create a circuit split.259 Prac-
tically, a potential split would take some time to come to fruition.260 
 Hoskins and the aforementioned cases in this Note were 
based on the deliberate intent of Congress.261 It is more likely that, 
given the importance of statutory construction and interpretation 
in the above cases, the government will hone in on the possibility 
of future congressional action.262 The Second Circuit understood 
that at common law, “persons who intentionally direct or facili-
tate the crimes physically executed by others must be held ac-
countable for their actions” and “this recognition was effectuated 
in the following circumstances. First, if the crime is defined so as to require more 
than one person for its commission so as to render the second participant a principal 
rather than an aider and abettor. See Firtash, 391 F. Supp. 3d at 890. Second, 
if the participant is the victim of the crime, he cannot be an aider and abettor. 
Id. Lastly, if the participant is part of the class the statute is designed to protect, 
that participant is also not an aider and abettor. Id. (citing Gebardi v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 (1932)).  
258 Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1234.  
259 STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 116. 
260 Kara Brockmeyer et al., Second Circuit Curbs FCPA Application to Some 
Foreign Participants in Bribery, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON 6–7 (Aug. 2018), https:// 
www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2018/08/fcpa%20update 
_august%202018_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4SZ-7DGC]; United States v. Hoskins—
Second Circuit Rejects DOJ’s Attempt to Expand the Extraterritorial Reach of the 
FCPA Through Conspiracy and Complicity Doctrines, SULLIVAN CROMWELL 1, 4 
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-Second 
-Circuit-Limits-Extraterritorial-Reach-of-FCPA.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y9Q-YE 
TJ] [hereinafter SULLIVAN & CROMWELL PUBLICATION]. 
261 See generally Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69; Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1423; Gebardi, 
287 U.S. 112; Amen, 831 F.2d 373. 
262 See generally Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69; Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1423; Gebardi, 
287 U.S. 112; Amen, 831 F.2d 373. 
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by developing the doctrines of conspiracy.”263 However, there remain 
exceptions to common law and the reach of the conspiracy statute.264 
In Hoskins, Judge Pooler argued: 
Accepting Gebardi’s teaching that conspiracy and complicity li-
ability will not lie when Congress demonstrates an affirmative 
legislative policy to leave some type of participant in a criminal 
transaction unpunished, the question becomes how to identify 
such a policy.... [W]e cannot identify such a policy whenever a 
statute focuses on certain categories of persons at the exclusion 
of others ... In both [Gebardi and Amen] the courts looked to 
the text of the statute and the purpose that Congress was trying 
to achieve thereby honoring their “over-arching obligation to give 
effect to congressional intent” when interpreting statutes.265  
Put more simply, where Congress deliberately identifies 
which class of individuals will be liable, courts cannot read in 
other classes to extend liability.266 Similarly, Judge Lynch in his 
concurrence expressed concern that allowing courts to “read in” 
their own interpretation of the law, despite what is plainly stated, 
goes against the very “obligation[s]” courts have to “honor[ ]” Con-
gress.267 This very principle consequently opens the door for con-
gressional action.268 
 Judge Lynch continued, stating his belief that the Hoskins 
result seems “questionable as a matter of policy.”269 Judge Lynch 
dove deeper into congressional intent than Judge Pooler by focusing 
on the actual purpose of the law.270 He reasoned the purpose was 
to avoid perpetuating crimes under the FCPA while also respecting 
the sovereignty of the foreign countries involved.271 Consequently, 
these purposes are not hindered by attaching conspiracy liability 
to persons who are not physically present in the United States or 
who are not necessarily depicted in the statute’s plain text.272 
263 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 77. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 80–81 (citations omitted). 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 BRINSON, supra note 176, at 3. 
269 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 102 (Lynch, J., concurring). 
270 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 102 (Lynch, J., concurring); BRINSON, supra note 176, 
at 3.  
271 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 102 (Lynch, J., concurring); BRINSON, supra note 176, 
at 3. 
272 BRINSON, supra note 176, at 3. 
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 As a result, while Judge Lynch agreed with the textual read-
ing of the statute, he seemed troubled by the possibility that a person 
who was a member of “the team that reached the United States” 
could not be found to have conspired with the U.S. subsidiary to per-
petuate FCPA violations.273 There is a distinct difference between 
the concept of agency and the actions of “instructors.”274 That is, 
agency requires a person to act on behalf of another, and therefore 
acts as an extension of the principal.275 Conversely, instructors 
teach and guide others to proper practice or study.276 This inevi-
table distinction proves concerning and allows individuals to act 
under the guise of an instructor to avoid criminal liability.277 This 
creates an incentive for multinational corporations to “instruct” 
individuals rather than to expressly identify agents.278 
 The potential problems arising from the Second Circuit’s 
decision invites Congress to amend the FCPA again.279 Presumably, 
Congress may choose to expand liability beyond the groups ex-
pressly included in the statute.280 The success of such an amend-
ment, however, seems unlikely given President Trump’s previous 
comments that the FCPA makes “it difficult for U.S. companies to 
compete overseas.”281 Similarly, in 2012, President Trump called for 
a change to the law, and enforcement under the FCPA appears to 
be declining despite officials in the administration claiming that 
they are “committed to enforcing it.”282 Given the apparent decline 
in enforcement proceedings under the FCPA and the President’s 
stance, it seems unlikely that any real changes will be made to the 
law in the near future.283  
273 Hoskins, 902 F.3d at 103. 
274 Agency, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2019), https://en.oxforddictionaries 
.com/definition/agency [https://perma.cc/8MBE-MWEW]. 
275 Id. 
276 Instruct, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2019), https://en.oxforddictionaries 
.com/definition/instruct [https://perma.cc/7SL4-2GFG]. 
277 BRINSON, supra note 176, at 3. 
278 Id. at 3. 
279 Id. at 3–4. 
280 Id. 
281 Jim Zarroli, Trump Used to Disparage an Anti-Bribery Law; Will he Enforce 
it Now?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/08/561059 
555/trump-used-to-disparage-an-anti-bribery-law-will-he-enforce-it-now [https:// 
perma.cc/C57Q-FKMU]. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. Furthermore, at present, the 115th Congress has not chosen to amend 
the FCPA. BRINSON, supra note 176, at 3. 
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B. The Implications of Hoskins on Attaching Agency Theory to 
Foreign Officials 
 Moving beyond affirmative actions that the government 
may take, there are more practical implications that may occur as a 
result of the Hoskins decision. Legal scholars have suggested that 
the scope of the decision may impact only a rather small portion 
of cases.284 These theories exist primarily because individuals and 
corporations that have previously been guilty for violating the 
FCPA have been found to do so under traditional agency theories.285 
While agency theory may provide valid insights into current FCPA 
enforcement provisions, agency has rarely—if ever—been used to 
apply liability to foreign individuals or companies that exist in a 
space “unreachable” by the FCPA’s jurisdictional bounds.286 
Hoskins established that only those foreign officials who are 
“agents, employees, officers, directors, or shareholders of an Ameri-
can issuer of domestic concern” may be liable for violations of the 
FCPA.287 Though the Second Circuit determined that Hoskins 
could not be liable for conspiring, the court did not foreclose the 
possibility of liability upon a sufficient showing of agency.288 This 
holding created a fundamental hole in the FCPA doctrine. This 
decision ensures, without question, that a foreign national must 
be an agent of an American company to attach conspiracy and 
complicity liability, though the court refused to express just how 
a person could be an agent of domestic concern.289 
 Consequently, the Second Circuit’s decision in Hoskins will 
likely have spillover effects into agency theory as the DOJ and 
SEC attempt to indict foreign individuals engaged in conduct vi-
olative of the FCPA.290 An agent acts on behalf of another—the 
principal—and is subject to the principal’s control.291 An agency 
relationship creates a basic fiduciary obligation as a principal 
“manifests assent to another,” the agent, to “act on the principal’s 
284 Brockmeyer et al., supra note 260, at 6. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. 
287 United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 97 (2d Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). 
288 Id. at 98.  
289 See id. 
290 Olesya Sidorkina, Establishing Corporate Parent Liability for FCPA Vi-
olations, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 89, 98 (2013). 
291 Id. 
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behalf and subject to the principal’s control,” and the agent pro-
vides his consent to such actions.292 Scholars have debated the 
certainty of agency theory and have, at times, considered agency 
to be a vague standard.293 
 The government, however, often “takes an expansive view 
of ... agency” when it prosecutes FCPA violations.294 Currently, 
the SEC and DOJ do engage in prosecutions under agency theory 
for violations of the FCPA.295 Multinational companies, in partic-
ular, engage in actions that open themselves up to agency liability 
under the FCPA more frequently than individuals or other na-
tionally based companies.296 These companies often open them-
selves up to liability by employing third parties to work on their 
behalf.297 Companies are thereby required, under their fiduciary 
duty of loyalty, to monitor the actions of the third parties or oth-
erwise be subject to FCPA liability.298 
 Consequently, it is possible that the government will try to 
broaden its basic definition of agency to hold foreign individuals 
and companies who allegedly conspired or aided in violations of 
the FCPA.299 Shifting from conspiracy to agency will inherently 
avoid the effects of the Second Circuit’s decision and perhaps pro-
vide stronger grounds for FCPA prosecution.300 The Second Circuit 
did not fully answer whether Hoskins could be tried as an agent 
of the Alstom U.S. subsidiary, thus leaving the door open for the 
government to engage in similar indictments later.301 Should the 
government pursue Hoskins or other foreign individuals or com-
panies under this theory, the contours of agency may begin to be 
more clearly delineated.302 
292 Id. 
293 Id. at 99. 
294 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL PUBLICATION, supra note 260, at 4; see also Hoskins, 
902 F.3d at 83 (maintaining the decision did not foreclose attaching agency to 
foreign nationals such as Hoskins); RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 242, at 34. 
295 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL PUBLICATION, supra note 260, at 4. 
296 Thomas J. Bussen, Midnight in the Garden of Ne Bis in Idem: The New 
Urgency for an International Enforcement Mechanism, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 485, 489 (2015).  
297 Id. at 490. 
298 Id. at 491. 
299 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL PUBLICATION, supra note 260, at 4. 
300 Id. 
301 United States v. Hoskins, 902 F.3d 69, 97–98 (2018). 
302 Id.; SULLIVAN & CROMWELL PUBLICATION, supra note 260, at 4. 
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 While it is clear that conspiracy claims are no longer viable 
for persons that are not considered agents and who have not 
stepped foot in the United States, agency is inherently broad and 
fact-specific, hinging on matters of control and the scope of em-
ployment.303 Factual specificity is key in these determinations,304 
and it remains to be seen how individuals in Hoskins’s position 
can be deemed agents of U.S. issuers or domestic concerns. Deter-
mining the true impacts of such theories will inevitably fall on 
later courts, including the Second Circuit, to determine at what 
point a foreign individual or corporate entity becomes an agent 
and can therefore be liable under the FCPA. 
 Specifically, Hoskins may result in implications for joint 
ventures as a matter of agency theory. “Few laws pose greater 
risks to multinational businesses than the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act.”305 For businesses, this means strict compliance, whis-
tleblowing where necessary, and ensuring that all cross-border 
engagements are up to par with the requirements of the law.306 
Joint ventures, in particular, are “high-risk” engagements that “come 
with a myriad of anti-bribery compliance challenges.”307 When en-
gaging in joint ventures, issuers and businesses in the United 
States have reason to fear being tagged with vicarious liability for 
the actions of their international partners.308 This concern pri-
marily comes from the definitional “fluid[ity]” of joint ventures.309 
Based in contract, they may be characterized in a variety of ways, 
taking on a variety of risks, control, and everything in between “an 
arm’s length deal and a full merger.”310 
 Under the FCPA, joint ventures have traditionally been 
targeted through agency.311 Agency liability traditionally attaches 
vicariously to joint ventures based on the actions of venture partners 
who act on behalf of the joint venture.312 The primary concern is 
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thus the extent of control the “parent” has over the persons engaging 
in the transaction.313 The Resource Guide does not mention any 
strict expectations or liability beyond stating that an issuer is re-
sponsible for ensuring that its subsidiaries, which may include 
joint ventures, comply with all FCPA provisions.314 More suc-
cinctly, issuers in the United States may therefore be liable for 
the acts of their subsidiaries or joint venture partners where they 
“authorize, direct, or control” such persons’ activity.315 Conse-
quently, investors and companies engaging in these joint ven-
tures should evaluate the risks involved in pursuing the venture 
in light of strict FCPA requirements.316 
 Despite the typical risks involved in joint ventures, the Sec-
ond Circuit’s decision in Hoskins may actually prove to be benefi-
cial for foreign companies doing business with U.S. companies via 
joint ventures.317 History recognizes the likelihood of attaching 
agency theory to joint ventures, but history also puts forth evi-
dence that conspiracy charges have been used to attach liability 
in circumstances that would now otherwise be inappropriate un-
der Hoskins.318 Before Hoskins, for example, the government at-
tached conspiracy liability to “actions involving Marubeni, JGC 
Corporation, and Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. in connection 
with the TSKJ joint ventures.”319 These cases involved foreign 
companies participating in transnational joint ventures.320 Work-
ing with these transnational companies leads to a variety of risks, 
including increased FCPA exposure.321 
 The Hoskins decision suggests that foreign businesses as-
sociating with domestic issuers or concerns may now have stronger 
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defenses if charged as coconspirators to FCPA violations.322 With-
out application of agency theory in the case of the TSKJ joint ven-
tures, for example, multinational businesses now face less risk, so 
long as they avoid authorizing or controlling conduct of joint ven-
ture partners.323 
CONCLUSION 
 The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hoskins may 
have several implications for future enforcement of the FCPA. Per-
haps most notably, should the SEC and DOJ choose to pursue fur-
ther litigation to create a circuit split, it could result in a grant of 
certiorari by the Supreme Court. It is more likely, however, that 
the government will seek to attach liability under basic agency 
theory. While most cases are privately settled, it is likely that the 
government will seek to further ascertain the reach of its power 
to prevent foreign corruption and bribery.324 Nonetheless, at pre-
sent, the practical implications are yet to be seen but will perhaps 
be far-reaching. Overall, Hoskins provides another example of 
courts rejecting pleas to expand jurisdictional liability in cases 
where Congress has not explicitly intended.325 In so doing, the 
Second Circuit potentially “jeopardizes the government’s ability 
to charge foreign companies and individuals.”326 As it stands today, 
foreign persons who do not take action on U.S. soil or who act in-
dependently, but who have conspired to promote FCPA violations, 
are virtually untouchable by the U.S. government.327 
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